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In the SupreDie Court 
of the State of Utah 
DWIGHT L. KING. Administrator of the 
Estate of GER~~LD DALLAS 
THOMAS, deceased, 
vs. 
Pla\intiff ,and 
Respondent, 
THE DENYER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD CO~IP ANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 7221 
Case 
The statement of facts contained in the brief of 
appellant accurately describes the physical objects and 
conditions existing at the place where Gerald Dallas 
Thomas, plaintiff's decedent, was killed. However, the 
statement of facts leaves a number of things unstated 
and to give a complete picture of the occurrences of Oe-
tober 11, 1947, the day on which decedent was killed, we 
believe it necessary to give a few more details. 
Thomas had worked only six days on this particular 
job and while the conductor Barnes had worked on pre-
vious occasions at this particular place and on this job 
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he had on this occasion only been there the same length 
of time as Thomas (R. 186). 
Shortly before the occurrence of Thomas' death it 
had been determined by Barnes, who was the conductor 
and in charge of the switching crew (R. 143), that two 
cars located on the load track north of the bin track were 
to be taken out to the bin and there spotted in order 
that the coal might be placed in the bin (R. 163). There 
were two possible ways in which this spotting could be 
accomplished. The first way was to shove the coal cars 
out to the bin by the use of the engine (R. 147). In 
performing this operation the air brake system would 
have been connected and brakes under all of the cars 
would be in use as well as the propelling force of the 
engine (R. 149, 247, 248, 24,9). 'The second method was 
to drop the cars down to the bin by force of gravity and 
the brakeman necessarily riding the car would have to 
use the hand brake to stop the cars at the proper spot 
on the bin (R.149). 
Barnes had determined to accomplish this task by 
the use of the engine with its more adequate braking 
system and the propelling force of the engine. He de-
termined upon this m-ethod because of the fact that "Qoth 
Thomas and Schauster had never performed the opera-
tion by the use of gravity and the hand brake in spot-
ting cars in the right place on the bin (R. 166, 167) . 
.At the time the train crew started 'to perform the 
task of placing these cars upon the bin, thirteen cars 
were on the load track north of the switch leading from 
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that track to the bin track (R. 153, 160). Immediately 
north of this bin switch on the load track were seven 
cars coupled together. Then to the north of them was 
a space and six cars coupled together (R. 153). The 
middle two cars of this cut of six cars were destined for 
the bin. The first operation which was necessary was 
the removal of the cut of seven cars and also the 
south two cars of the cut of six cars. The engine was 
to the south of the cut of seven cars headed up the can-
yon, which "\vould be toward the north. For some un-
explained reason the engineer, after coupling on to the 
cut of seven cars, did not effect a coupling between the 
seven car and six car cuts but instead immediately started 
the engine south on the load track pulling the cut of 
seven cars south on that track to the crossover, shown 
on Exhibit "A", which leads over the main line track 
and onto the storage tracks (R. 160, 161). After suc-
cessfully pulling these seven cars onto the storage track, 
the engine was derailed (R. 162). Shortly thereafter 
Brown, the station agent for the defendant company, ap-
peared on the scene and informed Barnes that unless the 
cars with the coal were placed on the bin track right away 
that it would be necessary for the coke ovens to cease 
their operation because of a lack of coal (R. 164, 165). 
After the coal was placed in the bin it was loaded into 
small cars and carried to the coke overis. 
Brown requested that the two cars be dropped and 
spotted on the bin without waiting for the engine to be 
placed again in service (R. 165, 188, 189). While Barnes 
testified that this was not an unusual method of accomp-
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lishing this task (R. 182, 183), nevertheless, it was not 
the manner in which he had been accustomed to placing 
the cars on the bin ( R. 184). In fact Barnes had never 
seen anyone besides a brakeman by the name of Burke 
take cars out in this manner (R. 188). Burke had been 
on this particular job for four or five years (R. 187). 
Pursuant to this request of the station agent Barnes 
decided to spot the coal cars on the bin in the second 
way described above. 
To accomplish this task the six cars were then 
dropped to within a few feet north of the bin switch. 
Four persons, consisting of Barnes, Schauster and two 
car droppers, performed this work (R. 163). The two 
rear brakes were left dragging and the four men ap-
parently operated the other four brakes (R. 164). 
Thomas and Schauster, after uncoupling the two cars 
on the south, dropped them onto the storage track. They 
then returned to the cars which were to he placed on the 
bin (R. 1'67). These two cars were loaded with coal and 
weighed between one hundred and one hundred and three 
tons each (R. 151, 152). Thomas, who had never before 
accomplished this operation (R. 167), climbed onto the 
brake platform on the south end of the south car. 
Schauster uncoupled the two cars from the other two 
which were standing on the track and released the brake 
on the second car which then placed the two cars in 
readiness for their trip to the bin, some 3000 feet to the 
south (R. 244). 
From the testimony it appears that in accomplish-
ing this operation the momentum of the cars is obtained 
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in the first fiYe or six hundred feet, and that from that 
point on the speed of the cars is comparatively regular 
all the way out (R. 1-!~l, 150). The momentum of the 
cars cannot be lost at any point until the cars are brought 
to a stop in the right place on the bin. This is because 
the track after the first steep grade has been passed is 
comparatively level and if the momentum is permitted 
to stop at any other place it would be necessary for an 
engine to be brought down on the bin track to complete 
the trip to the bin (R. 188). 
Thomas released the brake and the cars started on 
their way (R. 244). Until the cars arrived at the ap-
proach to the bin no one observed Thomas or his acti-
vities, except the defendant's witness, Arnett W. Dodds, 
who saw him for part of the way down, from a point 
marked "D" to about a point marked "D-4" on Exhibit 
"A" (R. 312, 315, 316). At this time Thomas was stand-
ing on the brake platform. He had hold of 'the brake 
wheel, with his body and his feet planted toward the 
car, and his head turned to the south in the direction the 
cars were proceeding (R. 319). The speed of the cars 
was variously estimated by the witnesses. The jury could 
have found from the testimony that at the end of the 
steep grade the cars were moving about thirty-five miles 
per hour (R. 291) and that at the time they arrived at 
the bin they were moving approximately four miles per 
hour (R. 194). 
The defendant called as its witness, Silas Ross (R. 
287). Ross was stationed in what is known as the scale 
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house located from 75 to 80 yards south of the bin (R. 
289). Before the two coal cars had commenced their 
trip to the bin he had become concerned about the neces-
sity of closing down the operation of the coke ovens if 
the coal was not delivered to the bin (R. 300). As a 
result he kept looking out of ,a window in the scale house 
toward the 'load track where the cars were then stationed. 
He observed the cars leave the load track and start on 
their journey '(R. 290). He saw them for fleeting mo-
ments on this journey but was unable to observe Thomas 
on the front brake platform until the cars reached the 
approach to the bin at a point marked R-4 on Exhibit 
"A" (R. 290-293). At this time Thomas was standing on 
the brake platform with his body facing toward the car 
and his head turned· facing in the direction he was go-
ing (R. 293, 294). 
Defendant in its brief states that Thomas had not 
applied "any brake." It is obvious that the witness Ross 
could not testify whether or not the brake had been ap-
plied up to this point. This was the first time that he 
was able to see the brakeman and what had occurred 
previous to this time he could not state. The jury could 
well have come to the conclusion that even at this point 
Ross was unable to determine whether or not 'Thomas 
was making an application of the brake. The uncertainty 
of his testimony on this subject is indicated by the fol-
lowing quoted portions of the record (R. 293): 
"Q. And at that time did you see the brakeman 
on the head of these cars 1 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \Yhat, if anything, was he doing with refer-
ence to the brakes ¥ 
A. He was standing on the platform. He hadn't 
applied anything, he hadn't applied any 
brake, or anything. 
Q. :\IR. RA \\TLINGS: I ask that that be stricken 
as his conclusion. 
THE COURT: I think all he intends to convey 
now is the times when he saw them. I don't 
suppose he is talking about times when he 
didn't see them. What is it, an objection or 
motion¥ 
MR. RAWLINGS: We had a motion. 
THE COURT: The motion will be denied. 
Q. Now, on these previous points that you saw 
these cars, did you see the brakeman at that 
time¥ 
A. I noticed him in about this position first. 
Q. What, if anything was he doing at that time~ 
A. He was standing on the platform. 
Q. Was he doing anything to the brakes¥ 
A. No, sir . 
• • • 
Q. Which direction was he facing~ 
A. Facing towards the bins. (R. 294) 
Q. Could you see whether or nO't he had his hwnd 
on the b;rake? 
A. No, sir, that is to10 far OJWay. 
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Q. When you saw him at this last point you have 
mentioned, could you see whether or not he 
had his hand on the brake at that time~ 
A. Yes, he had it in the prescribed way. 
* * * 
Q. What, if a;nything, wa-s he doing with the 
brake, so far as you could see? 
A. So far ,as I could see he was sta;nding in the 
prescribed position. 
Q. And that is facing outward~ 
A. It would be facing eastward. 
Q. In the direction the car was going~ 
A. Yes, he had his head turned that way. His 
body was turned that way.'' 
It is submitted that from the foregoing testimony the 
jury could find that Thomas was standing in the pre-
scribed way for application of the brake but that Ro~s 
was too far away to say that he was not making an ap-
plication of the brake. Defendant's statement that the 
evidence or testimony supports his statement that there 
had been no application of the brake to this point is 
directly contrary to the testimony of Ross, who on cross-
examination stated : "I don't know whether he had ap• 
plied the brakes or not.'' (R. 304) 
Ross further testified that the bin then obscured 
his view and that he did not again see Thomas until he 
arrived at the sign saying "Danger. Cars not 'to be 
dropped beyond this point.'' This sign is approximately 
fifty feet north of the south end of the bin. While 
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Thon1as was traveling through this space Ross could not 
say whether or not Thomas ·had been making a vigorous 
application of the brake. He so testified (R. 306): 
"Q. You don't know whether he had been work-
ing on the brake vigorously, or not, up to that 
ti1ne, do you~ 
A. No, sir." 
Ross then testified that Thomas appeared to glance 
at the danger sign and then make a vigorous application 
of the brake (R. 295). Thomas then attempted to either 
step down on the coupling or jump off to the side (R. 
307). It is interesting to note that Ross testified that 
the cars did not in any way slow down after this vigorous 
application of the brake. 
'' Q. When you saw the cars subsequently was 
there any change in the speed~ 
A. No, they seemed to stay at the relative 
speed.'' ( R. 296) 
In meeting the contentions and points raised by the 
defendant, we will treat the evidence more in detail here-
after but with the foregoing additions and with the ex-
ception of the evidence relating to the negligence in main-
taining the bumper device and that relating to damages 
the statement of facts contained in the brief of appellant 
is satisfactory. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IF THERE IS AN EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR 
THE NEGLIGENCE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY, 
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT THERE IS IN-
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE CANNOT BE SUS-
TAINED. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS AN EVIDENTIARY BASIS TO SUP-
PORT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE HAND 
BRAKE ON THE CAR RIDDEN BY PLAINTIFF'S 
DECEDENT WAS NOT AN EFFICIENT HAND 
BRAKE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SAFETY 
APPLIANCE ACT. 
POINT III. 
THERE WAS: SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
JUSTIFY SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF THE 
ISSUES OF THE INSECURITY OF THE COAL BIN 
AND THE DANGEROUS AND HAZARDOUS SITU-
ATION EXISTING AS A RESULT OF SUCH IN-
SECURITY. 
POINT IV. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT WERE 
NOT REPETITIOUS, DID NOT UNDULY EMPHA-
SIZE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF THE CASE AND 
WERE NOT UNBALANCED TO THE PREJUDICE 
OF THE DEFENDANT. 
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POINTY. 
THE TR.I~-\.L COURT DID NOT COMMIT ER.ROR 
IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 7 AND 8. 
POINT \TI. 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE ESTAB-
LISHED AS :JL-\.TTER OF LAW THAT DEFEND-
ANT W~-\.S NEGLIGENT AND THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
DECEDEXT THO:JIAS \VAS NOT GUILTY OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND HENCE ANY ER-
RORS REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS RELATING 
TO LIABILITY DO NOT CONSTITUTE PREJU-
DICIAL OR REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
POINT VII. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROPERLY RAISED 
THE OBJECTION IT NOW ASSERTS TO THE 
TRIAL COURT INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS 
MATTER OF LAW ON THE QUESTION OF INTER-
STATE COMMERCE. 
POINT VIII. 
DEFENDANT HAS NO RIGHT TO SET OFF 
ANNUITIES PAYABLE UNDER THE RAILROAD 
RETIREMENT ACT. 
POINT IX. 
THE VERDICT IS NOT EXCESSIVE AND THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO ORDER A REDUCTION IN THE 
AMOUNT OR A NEW TRIAL. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IF THERE IS AN EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR 
THE NEGLIGENCE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY, 
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT THERE IS IN-
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE CANNOT BE SUS-
TAINED. 
It is to be noted that defendant does not assert that 
the evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain the 
verdict rendered. It does not contend that its motion for 
a directed verdict should have been granted. 
It should need no argument to sustain the propo~ 
sition that the rules laid down by the Supreme Court of 
the United States regarding insufficient evidence is 
applicable to the grounds upon which defendant seeks a 
reversal of the judgment in this case. In other words, 
if there is an evidentiary basis to support the finding 
of an inefficient hand brake plaintiff's first contention 
cannot be sustained. To sustain that point there must be 
"a complete absence of probative facts to support" such 
finding. This is also true as to defendant's second point 
concerning the bumper device. 
The rules laid down by the Supreme Court of the 
United States relating to insufficiency of the evidence 
are universally recognized as very liberal rules in favor 
of the verdict rendered by the jury. Perhaps the best 
example of this liberality is found in the case of Lav-
ender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 740, 744 (1946). 
That was an action brought under the F.E.L.A. to re-
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13 
cover for the wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent. The 
evidence there showed that the deceased opened a switch 
to permit a train to back into the station, that it was his 
duty then to cross the track before the train passed the 
switch and he ·was seen to so cross. There was evidence 
that it was his duty to wait at the switch on that side of 
the track until the train had cleared, then close the switch, 
return to his shanty near the crossing and change the 
signals from red to green. The evidence further showed 
that the train passed along the track at the rate of eight 
or ten miles per hour. The switch, however, was not 
closed and the. signals were not changed after it passed. 
Upon investigation deceased was found near the switch 
lying face downward on the ground unconscious. He was 
dead upon arrival at the hospital. He had been struck 
in the back of the head causing a fractured skull. There 
were no known eyewitnesses to the fatal blow. There 
was evidence that on the side of the train where de-
ceased was found a mail hook hung down loosely on the 
outside of the mail car. This end was 73 inches above 
the top of the rail, which was 7 inches high. The over-
hang of the mail car in relation to the rails was about 
two to two and one-half feet. The evidence indicated 
that when the mail car swayed or moved around a curve 
the mail hook might pivot causing the end to swing out 
as much as twelve to fifteen inches. 'This end could be 
swung out to a point three to three and a half feet from 
the rail. On both sides of the track were uneven mounds 
of cinders and dirt rising at its highest points 18 to 24 
inches above the tops of the rails. Witnesses differed as 
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to how close these mounds were to the rails but estimates 
ran from three to fifteen feet. If this mail hook swung 
out it would be from 49 to 55 inches above the highest 
parts of the mounds. Deceased was 67lf2 inches tall. 
His wound was about four inches below the top of his 
head or 63lf2 inches above the point where he stood on 
the ground, the Supreme Court remarking: "Well within 
the possible range of the mail hook end.'' Based upon 
this evidence the Supreme Court held that a finding of 
negligence could be supported requiring the finding that 
the mail hook came in contact with deceased's head. The 
lower court stated that "All reasonable minds would 
agree that it would be mere speculation and conjecture 
to say that Haney was struck by the mail hook." The 
Supreme Court of the United States~ however, held that 
it could not be said that such finding was unsupported 
by probative facts or to be so unreasonable as to warrant 
taking the case from the jury. The Supreme Court con-
ceded that it was true that there was evidence tending 
to show that it was physically and mathematically im-
possible for the hook to strike Haney and that there were 
facts from which it could be reasonably inferred that 
deceased was murdered. However, the Court stated : 
'' * * * But such evidence has become irre-
levant upon appeal, there being a reasonable 
basis in the record for inferring that the hook 
struck Haney. The jury having made that in-
ference, the respondents were not free to reliti-
gate the factual dispute in a reviewing court. 
Under these circumstances it would be an undue 
invasion of the jury's historic function for an 
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appellate rourt to weigh the conflicting evidence, 
judge the credibility of witnesses and arrive at 
a conclusion opposite from the one reached by 
the jury. * * * 
''It is no answer to say that the jury's ver-
dict involved speculation and conjecture. When-
eYer facts are in dispute or the evidence is such 
that fairminded men may draw different infer-
ences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is 
required on the part of those whose duty it is 
to settle the dispute by choosing what seems to 
them to be the most reasonable inference. Only 
when there is a oomplete ~abs1ence of !probative 
facts to support the oonclusion reached does a 
reversible err:or appear. But where, as here, 
there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's ver-
dict, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve what-
ever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion. 
And the appellate court's function is exhausted 
when that evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it 
being immaterial that the court might draw a 
contrary inference or feel that another conclusion 
is more reasonable.'' 
Defendant's contentions with relation to the insuf-
ficiency of the evidence to support findings on the 
grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support 
such findings constitute a contention that plaintiff was 
not entitled to a jury trial of those issues. We again 
quote from the Supreme Court of the United States to 
show the liberality of the rules laid down by that court 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lll 
in supporting jury findings. In Bailey v. Central Ver-
mont R. Co., 319 U.S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 1064, 87 L. Ed. 
1444, the Court stated: 
''The right to trial by jury is 'a basic and 
fundamental feature of our system of federal 
jurisprudence.' Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 
752, 62 S. Ct. 854, 86 L. Ed. 1166. It is part 
and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad work-
ers under the Employers' Liability Act. Re·aso"YYr 
able care and oause and effect are as elusive here 
.as in other fields. But the jury has been chosen 
as the appropriate tribunal to apply those stand-
ards to the facts of these personal injuries. That 
method of determining the liability of the car-
riers and of placing on them the cost of these 
industrial accidents may be crude, archaic, and 
expensive as compared with the more modern 
systems of workmen's compensation. But how-
ever inefficient and backward it may be, it is 
the system which Congress has provided. To 
deprive these workers of the benefit ·of .a jury 
trial in close or doubtful Clases is to take away a 
goodly portion of the relief which Congress has 
afforded them.'' 
In Tiller v. AtZant~c Co·ast Line R. Oo., 318 U. S. 54, 
63 S. Ct. 444, 451, 87 L. Ed. 610, it is stated: 
'' * * * Many years ago this Court said of the 
problems of negligence, 'We see no reason, so 
long as the jury system is the law of the land, and 
the jury is made the tribunal to decide disputed 
questions of fact, why it should not decide such 
questions as these as well as others.' Jones v. 
East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., 128 U. S. 443, 445, 
9 S. Ct. 118, 32 L. Ed. 478. Or as we have put it 
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on another occasion, • "\Vhere the facts are in dis-
pute, and the eYidence in relation to them is that 
fron1 which fair-minded 1nen may draw different 
inferences,· the case should go to the jury. * * * 
"It appears to be the clear Congressional in-
tent that to the maximum extent proper, ques-
tions in actions arising under the Act should be 
left to the jury." 
We will hereafter demonstrate that the evidence 
introduced in this case supports the findings of negli-
gence upon the grounds submitted to the jury within the 
rules laid down by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS AN EVIDENTIARY BASIS TO SUP-
PORT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE HAND 
BRAKE ON THE CAR RIDDEN BY PLAINTIFF'S 
DECEDENT WAS NOT AN EFFICIENT HAND 
BRAKE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SAFETY 
APPLIANCE ACT. 
The most recent case before the Supreme Court of 
the United States construing the hand brake provision 
of the Safety Ap,pli(})'nce Act ( 45 U.S..C.A., Section 11) 
is the case of Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U.S. 477, 67 S. 
Ct. 1334, 1336, 1338. That Act provides: 
" '* * * it shall be unlawful for any common 
carrier subject to the provisions of this Act (of 
April 14, 1910) to haul, or permit to be hauled or 
used on its line, any car subject to the provisions 
of this Act not equipped with appliances provided 
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for in this act, to wit: All cars must be equipped 
with secure sill steps and efficient lvatJUl brakes; 
all cars requiring secure ladders and secure run-
ning boards shall be equipped with such ladders 
and running boards, and all cars having ladders 
shall also be equipped with secure hand holds or 
grab irons on their roofs at the tops of such lad-
ders : ~ * * '.'' 
After reviewing cases under the Safety Appliance 
Act the Court in the Myers case stated: 
"This simplifies the issue beyond that pre-
sented in the ordinary case under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act where the plaintiff must 
establish the negligence of his employer. Here it 
is not necessary to find negligence. A railroad 
subject to the Safety Appliance Acts may be 
found liable if the jury reasonably can infer from 
the evidence merely that the hand brake which 
caused the injuries was on a car which the rail-
road was then using on its line, in interstate com-
merce, and that the brake was not an 'efficient' 
hand brake. Furthermore-' There are two recog-
nized methods of showing the inefficiency of hand 
brake equipment. Evidence may be adduced to 
establish some particular defect, or the same in-
efficiency may be established by showing a failure 
to function, when operated with due care, in the 
normal, natural and usual manner.' Didinger 
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 6 Cir., 39 F. 2d 798, 799." 
The Myers case also recognizes the rule that '' Onl!y 
whern there is a complet~e absence of pr<olbat'iv,e fac'ts 1~o 
support the conclusion reached do,es a reversible error 
appear.'' 
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\Y e submit that it cannot be said there is a com-
plete absence of such probative facts in the case at bar. 
\Y e further submit that the testimony here presents an 
evidentiary basis that the inefficiency was established 
by showing a failure to function when operated with due 
care in the normal, natural and usual manner. 
At every point at which Thomas was o·bserved by 
anyone he was standing in the ''prescribed'' place and 
was in the ·'prescribed" position for the operation of 
this brake. When he mounted the car before its journey 
to the bin he climbed upon the brake platform and was 
in position to use the brake (R. 244). When he was 
seen by Dodds between points '' D'' and '' D-4'' on Ex-
hibit ''A'' he was riding on the brake platform with his 
feet and body planted toward the car and his head turned 
facing in the direction of the bin. He had hold of the 
brake wheel (R. 319). During this period of time the 
witness Dodds could not say definitely whether there was 
any difference in the speed of the cut of cars from the 
time he first saw them until he last saw them but he did 
say "They were running along steadily" (R. 317). He 
estimated the speed of the cars at thirty miles per hour 
(R. 320). When Ross first saw him he was leaning over 
the brake ( R. 306). 
At point R-2 on Exhibit "A" the defendant's wit-
ness Ross estimated the speed of the cars to be between 
25 and 35 miles per hour (R. 291). These two points, 
D-4 and R-2, are approximately three to four hundred 
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feet south of the point where the grade levels off. (See 
Exhibit "A"). 
It is to he noted that the witness Barnes testified: 
''The speed is usually attained about the 
first five or six hundred feet on the track there, 
on a heavy grade. After that the speed is com-
paratively regular all the way out." (R.149-150). 
The witness Barnes testified that when he saw 'the cars 
at a point B-1 (marked on Exhibit "A") the cars were 
going between eight and ten miles per hour (R. 193, 198). 
This point as measured on the map is approximately 
1100 feet from the trestle approach to the bin. (Barnes, 
however, in his testimony estimated this distance as be-
ing four to six hundred feet from the bin, R. 169). 
At this time the cars were slowing down and when 
they approached the bin they were moving approximately 
five or six miles an hour. Barnes estimated their speed 
at four miles per hour when they reached the bin (R. 
193, 194). When it is considered that the weight of 
these cars was between one hundred and one hundred 
and three tons apiece and the momentum coming down 
the steep grade together with the testimony of Barnes 
that if the original speed had been gathered the speed 
was regular thereafter probative facts are present which 
would indicate that Thomas was making application of 
the brakes as he rode along the track from point R-2 to 
B-1 (marked on Exhibit" A") and from thence on south 
to the bin. The map, Exhibit "A", indicates 'that there 
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is son1e slig-ht grade to the south except for two spaces 
of approximately one hundred feet each. The cars were 
slowing- down all along- this space and had been brought 
to the bin at a speed of four miles per hour. 
One piece of sig-nificant evidence showing- that while 
the brakes slowed the cars down they would not stop 
the cars is the testimony of Ross to the effect tha:t even 
after a vigorous application of the brakes there was 
no noticeable change in their speed. He testified that 
from the time he saw the cars at the danger sign to the 
point where he last saw them on the bin, even though 
there had been a vigorous application of the brake there 
was no reduction in the relative speed of the cars (R. 
296). 
We submit that from the testimony (1) Thomas 
at all times appeared to be in the performance of his 
duties, (2) that there was some application of the brakes 
in slowing the cars, ( 3) from the fact that the vigorous 
application of the brake while the cars were going four 
miles per hour made no noticeable difference in their 
speed, that an evidentiary basis exists for a finding 
that Thomas operated the brakes with due care in the 
normal, natural and usual manner, and that they failed 
to stop the cars at the spot desired on the bin. Certain-
ly it cannot be said that there is a complete absence of 
probative facts to support such finding. There is not 
one scintilla of evidence in this case that there was no 
application of the brake. Merely because the witness 
Ross was willing to say that there had been no applica-
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tion of brake does not prove that fact. As indicated, he 
conceded that he did not know what took place when he 
could not see Thomas. There is no testimony in the 
record that Thomas would have to make revolutions of 
the brake wheel in order to bring about the desired pres-
sure of the brakes on the wheel. 
Defendant's own expert indicated that there would 
not have to be any great show of physical exertion to 
bring about such pressure. At Record 334 he testified: 
"Q. What amount of pressure is necessary to 
apply this brake wheel in order to put those 
shoes against the wheel tight~ 
A. It takes very little pressure to start the pres-
sure on the brake shoe on the wheels.'' 
It is not necessary to use a brake club on this type 
of brake, the use of a hand on it is sufficient (R. 168). 
At the distances the witnesses were situated from 
Thomas, the jury could well have believed that they could 
not possibly say there had been no application of the 
brake and that Thomas could have been putting the 
necessary pressure on the brakes without any show of 
physical activity. 
We submit that this evidence creates an evidentiary 
basis for a finding that Thomas used the brake in the 
normal and usual manner but it failed to bring the cars 
to a complete stop as it should. 
Defendant in its brief has stated that the presump-
tion of due care on the part of deceased may not he con-
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sidered by the jury or the court in determining whether 
or not the evidence on this point is suffici~nt. However, 
under the facts and circumstances of the case at bar such 
presumption may be considered. 
In the case of-Worthington v. Elmer, 207 Fed. 306, 
308-309, the court considered this presumption of due 
care on the part of the deceased person in determining 
whether or not the evidence was sufficient. That case 
involved the proposition of whether or not the dece·ased 
used a brake. The court held that from the circum-
stances, together with this ·p~esumption of due care, 
such a finding could be made and in that connection the 
court stated: 
"However, it is urged that 'there is no evi-
dence that Rice was using the defective brake.' 
He was seen operating the brake of the oil car but 
was not seen alive thereafter. The defective 
brake of the box car was immediately in front of 
him when he was setting the brake of the oil car, 
and his lantern stood close to him on the plat-
form. The record is silent as to his movements 
between the time of setting the oil car brake and 
the collision. It is hard to conceive, in view of 
the distance between the point at which he boarded 
the car and the location of the standing cars, in 
connection with the close proximity of the brake 
on the box car, that there was not time for an ex-
perienced brakeman both to set the oil car brake 
and try to set the other brake. Everything that 
he was seen to do was in the prompt performance 
of acknowledged duty. Is it to be said, then, that 
he failed in so important a matter as at least to 
try to use the brake of the box car~ That was the 
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very next and the last ste-p to be taken in the dis-
charge of his duty; and his own safety as well as 
that of both the moving and standing cars de-
pended upon his performance of that duty. 
"It is settled in this court that on the defend-
ant's motion to direct it was the duty of the court 
to take the most favorable view of the plaintiff's 
evidence (Erie R. R. v. Weber & Kraft, 207 Fed. 
293, decided June 3, 1913; Tennessee Copper Co. 
v. Nevada Gaddy, 207 Fed. 297, decided on the 
same day), 'and from that evidence, and the in-
ferences reasonably and justifiably to be drawn 
therefrom, determine whether or not, under the 
law, a verdict might be found' for the plaintiff 
(Mt. Adams & E. P. Inclined Ry. Co. v. Lowery, 
74 Fed. at page 477, 20 C. C. A. 59·6, by the present 
Mr. Justice Lurton; see, also, L. & N. R. R. Co. v. 
Bell, 206 Fed. 395, decided by this court June 30, 
1913). 
"From the facts just pointed out and the most 
natural and reasonable inference deducible- there-
from, it was entirely justifiable to conclude that 
Rice continued in the performance of his duty re-
specting the brake on the box car between the 
time he was seen setting the opposite brake and 
the collision. As was said in Maguire v. Fitch-
burg Railroad, 146 Mass. 379, 15 N.E. 904, re-
specting the evidential effect of finding a de-
ceased employe's body at a place where his duty 
had called him : 
'' 'The jury might well have belic-;~ed that 
he was on the track in the performance of 
his duty and in the exercise of aU the care to 
be expected of a prudent man.' 
''See, also, Caron v. Boston & Albany Rail-
road, 164 Mass. 523, 525, 526, 42 N. E. 112. 
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"This is in principle like the presumption of 
performance of duty, which, in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, is indulged in favor of one 
who is injured at a railroad crossing; that is, that 
he stopped, looked, and listened before attempting 
to cross. Baltimore & Potomac R. R. v. Landri-
gan, 191 U. S. 461, 472, 2-l- Sup. Ct. 137, 48 L. Ed. 
262; P., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Scherer, 205 
Fed. 356, decided by this court l\Iay 6, 1913; 
Gates v. Beebe, 170 Mich. 107, 112, 135 N. W. 
934. The principle so alluded to is applicable 
under other and varying circumstances, where 
there is an absence, as here, of direct testimony 
on the subject in dispute. Prince v. Lowell Elec-
tric Light Corp., 201 Mass. 276, 281, 87 N. E. 558; 
Brown v. Coal Co., 143 Iowa, 662, 673, 120 N. W. 
732, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1260; Gilbert v. Ann 
Arbor R. Co., 161 Mich. 73, 79, 125 N. W. 7 45. It 
follows that the motion to direct was rightly over-
ruled.'' 
Also, in the case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Oo. v. 
Wetherington (Ala.), 16 So. 2d 720, the court made use 
of the presumption in a case where the causes of the 
accident were either the violation of the Boiler Inspec-
tion Act or the negligence of the deceased for whose 
death the action was brought under the F.E.L.A. This 
presumption was relied on to eliminate the negligence 
of the deceased, thereby justifying a finding that it was 
caused by the negligence of the company. 
The same situation exists in the case at bar. Either 
the brake was defective and would not stop the cars, or 
Thomas negligently failed to operate the brake. Thomas' 
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negligence is eliminated by the presumption, leaving the 
defective brake as the cause of his death . 
.Also, in the case of Te'YI!YIIant v. P,BoriJa & Pekin Union 
R. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520, the court 
also considered this presumption in determining the 
question of proximate cause. The court, after detailing 
certain other evidence, stated: 
''To this evidence must be added the pre-
sumption that the deceased was actually engaged 
in the performance of those duties and exercised 
due care for his own safety at the time of his 
death.'' 
POINT III. 
THERE W .A'S SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
JUSTIFY SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF THE 
ISSUES OF THE INSECURITY OF THE CO.AL BIN 
.AND THE DANGEROUS. .AND H.AZ.ARDOUS SITU-
ATION EXISTING .AS .A RESULT OF SUCH IN-
SECURITY. 
The grounds of negligence numbered (c) and (d) 
in the trial court's Instruction No. 1, which acts of negli-
gence are set forth at R. 67, are based fundamentally 
upon the failure of the defendant to furnish to decedent 
a reasonably safe place to work. When the cars were 
dropped southward along the bin track for the purpose 
of spotting them upon the bin it was absolutely neces-
sary that the person operating the car maintain the 
momentum of the cars. up to the very point at which 
the cars were to be stopped (R. 188). He could not stop 
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the cars on the bin track and then expect any momentum 
to be obtained to get them onto the bin. It would have 
been necessary for the engine to come down along the 
bin track and to push these cars over onto the bin if the 
momentum were arrested at any point north of the 
exact spot where the cars could be unloaded on the bin. 
Hence, a situation existed \vhere it could be anticipated 
that the momentum could not be arrested at the proper 
point and that some device should have been placed at 
the end of the bin which could have properly stopped the 
southward mom en tum of the cars. 
The only thing that the defendant provided for such 
a contingency was merely a raised platform on top of 
which the tracks were run, thereby affording a slightly 
inclined plane up which the cars must run. When these 
cars went on to this raised platform and rails the plat-
form gave way underneath the weight of the car. 
Mr. Barnes testified that as the cars were moving 
along the bin they were slowing down all the time, and 
were moving at a slow rate of speed. He saw them 
'' * * * hit the incline. They were moving very slowly 
then, because the end of the car raised up very slowly'' 
(R. 169). He further testified (R. 170): "* * * And it 
seemed that this incline broke away from under them, 
and they pitched right off of the bin onto the ground.'' 
From this testimony it appears that this incline 
which extended out over the end of the bin, as indicated 
by Exhibit ''A'' and which was not supported as solidly 
as the balance of the rails on the bin, gave way and there-
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by permitted the cars to fall thirty-four feet to the 
ground below, resulting in the death of Thomas. 
We submit that the jury could well find that this 
purported bumper device was insufficient and created a 
hazardous condition. The rails could have been placed 
on an incline in such a manner that the incline would 
have been supported as sturdily and securely as the rails 
were supported to the north of the incline and which 
were upon the bin itself, or some kind of a device could 
have been placed on the end of the rails to stop the cars. 
Bo~ston & M. R. R. v. M e,ech, 156 F. 2d 109 ( C.C.A. 
1), (Certiorari denied 329 U.S.. 763, 67 S. Ct.-124), sup-
ports the contention of plaintiff upon the proposition 
here asserted. That case was an action for death under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The second count 
of the complaint alleged that the decedent's death was 
caused by the defendant's failure to provide him with 
a reasonably safe place in which to work. 
The Court stated (at p. 111 of the Federal Reporter): 
''The sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the verdict on the second count is at least equal-
ly clear. The defendant might have painted lines 
on the platforms of its washstand to indicate the 
extent to which locomotives overhang them, and 
thus to warn persons on the platforms of ilie 
danger incident to standing near their inner 
borders, or it might even have set the platforms 
of its washstand back from the tracks far enough 
to prevent locomotives from overhanging them 
at all. 
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• 'From the foregoing, it is c.Iear that although 
some precautions were taken for the decedent's 
safety, further precautions were possible, and 
from this it follows, as we read the decisions cited 
above, that there was an 'evidentiary basis' for 
submitting the issue of the defendant's causal 
negligence to the jury, and hence that our 'func-
tion is exhausted.' Lavender v. Kurn et al, supra 
( 66 S. Ct. 7 44.)." 
POINT IV. 
THE IXSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT WERE 
NOT REPETITIOUS, DID NOT UNDULY EMPHA-
SIZE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF THE CASE AND 
WERE NOT UNBALANCED TO THE PREJUDICE 
OF THE DEFENDANT. 
The defendant's objections to the instructions of the 
trial court are only that they are repetitious, gave undue 
emphasis to plaintiff's case and were unbalanced as a 
whole. There is no contention under Point III of de-
fendant's brief that the instructions did not contain a 
correct statement of the law applicable to a violation of 
the Federal Safety Appliance Act. The defendant does 
not specifically assert that error was committed in In-
struction No. 1, wherein the trial court defined and sub-
mitted the issues as drawn by the pleadings in this case. 
In stating the issues in that instruction the court proper-
ly set forth the grounds upon which plaintiff asserted 
in its pleadings that the defendant was negligent. The 
trial court set forth the four specific allegations of negle-
gence as contained in plaintiff's complaint. 
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By its Instruction No. 2, the trial court defined the 
burden of proof and specifically stated that the burden 
was upon the plaintiff to prove by preponderance of the 
evidence that the death of Thomas was caused by the 
negligent acts of the defendant alleged in the complaint. 
The court also stated that this burden of proof was upon 
plaintiff to prove the violation of the Safety Appliance 
Act before there could be a recovery by plaintiff. In that 
instruction it was also stated that if the jury found that 
the weight of the evidence was in favor of the defendaln.t 
or was equally balanced defendant was entitled to aver-
dict of No Cause of Action. This instruction was one 
favoring the defendant in the sense that it was an in-
struction to the jury that the burden of proof was upon 
plaintiff and particularly called to the jury's attention 
the fact that this burden was upon the plaintiff in so far 
as any violation of the Safety Appliance Act was in-
volved. We are unable to see how the emphasis· of this 
burden of proof upon plaintiff could in anty way preju-
dice the defendant in this case. 
In Instruction No. 4, the trial court set forth the 
applicable provisions of the Federal Employer's Liability 
Act and the Federal Safety Appliance Act. To merely 
set forth the provisions of these statutes, and particu-
larly the Safety Appliance Act, would mean nothing to a 
jury and would not inform them of the law applicable 
to said statutes. To have only told the jury in the word-
ing of paragraph 4 of Instruction 4 of the provisions of 
the Federal Safety Appliance Act would not have in-
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formed the jury of th~ meaning of that sta:tute as oon-
strued by the courts. Certainly it was proper for the 
court to have set forth the exact provisions of the ap~ 
plicable Safety Appliance Act and then to later explain 
the meaning of that statute. 
Paragraph 5 of Instruction No. 4 quoted the pro-
vision of the Federal Employer's Liability Act, which 
provided that where there was a violation of a statute 
enacted for the safety of employees no employee killed as 
a result of such violation could be held guilty of contri-
butory negligence. This statute was applicable to the 
case and its quotation to the jury was not improper. 
By paragraph 6 of Instruction No. 4, the trial court 
instructed the jury that the defendant was subject to 
the provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Act. 
Plaintiff was entitled to have the jury instructed 
that the statutes set forth in the instruction were appli-
cable to the defendant and to the issues of the case being 
tried. 
By the seventh paragraph of Instruction No. 4, the 
jury was instructed concerning the duty which was im-
posed upon the defendant by this statute. Defendant 
does not contend that there was any error in the state-
ment of that duty. The duty imposed by this statute is 
the duty set forth by the court in the seventh paragraph 
of Instruction No. 4. That duty is an absolute, continuing 
and unqualified duty, and the failure to discharge that 
duty is not excused by any type of care, either reasonable 
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or utmost. Hence, by this paragraph of the instruction the 
jury was informed of this duty and its extent. There is 
no repetition in this statement and the jury is not told 
in two or three different ways of the extent of this duty. 
By the eighth paragraph of Instruction No. 4 the 
jury was instructed that if the defendant hauled or per-
mitted to be hauled or used a car upon which the hand 
brakes were inefficient in violation of the absolute duty 
so defined, then plaintiff was entitled to a verdict. This 
is a correct statement of the law and properly makes 
application of the Safety Appliance Act as quoted and as 
defined in the previous part of Instruction No. 4. 
Paragraph 9 of Instruction No. 4 sets forth the evi-
dence which the jury could consider in determining 
whether or not there was a violation of the Act. It may 
be that a jury would believe that some actual defect in 
the mechanism of the brake would be a necessary item of 
proof by plaintiff. However, the rule in Myers v. Read-
ing Co., 331 U.S. 477, 67 S. Ct. 1334, does not require that 
type of evidence. Certainly it was proper for the jury 
to be told that they could consider the evidence of failure 
to function in actual operation as evidence of an inef-
ficient brake. Defendant does not assert that this is an 
incorrect statement of one of the methods by which in-
efficiency may be proven. 
By the tenth paragraph of Instruction No. 4 the 
jury was told that if they should find that there was a 
violation of the Safety Appliance Act, as theretofore de-
fined in Instruction No. 4, that the jury should then disre-
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gard and not consider plaintiff's conduct which they may 
or may not believe to have constituted negligence. Here 
again, the court was making application to this case of 
statutes theretofore quoted and the jury was informed 
of the rule that an employee killed as a result of the vio-
lation of. the Safety Appliance Act could not be held 
guilty of contributory negligence. Defendant's answer 
did not specify any particular act as constituting con-
tributory negligence and this instruction was, therefore, 
necessary. 
By paragraph eleven of Instruction No. 4, the jury 
was told that the Safety Appliance Act was a statute 
enacted for the safety of employees and this instruc-
tion was certainly proper when considered with para-
graph 5 of Instruction No. 4, which eliminated contribu-
tory negligence where there was a vio'la tion of the 
statute ''enacted for the safety of employees.'' 
By Instruction No.5, the trial court made applicable 
to the case at bar the statement of the duty imposed by 
the statute as set forth in paragraph 7 of Instruction 
No. 4. By that instruction the jury was specifically in-
structed that this defendant by the exercise of reason-
able or the utmost care could not escape liability for a 
violation of the Safety Appliance Act. 
By Instruction No. 6, and particularly the first 
paragraph thereof, the trial court eliminated from the 
case the issue of interstate commerce by determining as 
a matter of law that both Thomas and the defendant 
were mutually engaged in interstate commerce. Defend-
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ant did not even except to this portion of Instruction No. 
6. 
The second paragraph of Instruction No. 6 consti-
tuted a specific application of the rule set forth in Para-
graph 10 of Instruction No. 4 to the evidence and con-
tentions made by defendant concerning alleged contri-
butory negligence. It is to be noted that by this instruc-
tion the court informed the jury that if there was a viola-
tion of Section 11 of the Safety Appliance Act, which 
contributed in whole or in part to Thomas' death, then 
they should disregard the evidence offered and received 
pertaining to the decedent's conduct in the discharge of 
his duties in slowing down the movement and bringing 
said car to a stop. This related to the specific testimony 
relied upon by defendant as evidence of negligence by 
the decedent Thomas. It may be that the tenth para-
graph of Instruction No. 4 should have been made to 
include this reference to specific acts but it is to be 
noted that said paragraph 10 was merely a statement of 
the rule called for by defendant's Answer and not an 
application of the rule to the evidence in this case. 
The law relating to a violation of the Safety Ap-
pliance Act cannot be told in two or three sentences and 
within the confines of one instruction. The law relat-
ing to the Safety Appliance Act requires some explana-
tion to the jury. The court, in explaining this law to the 
jury, saw fit to first generally state the provisions of the. 
statute and the duty imposed by that statute. After so 
defining the law, the court then pointed out the manner 
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in which these rules were applicable to the case at bar. 
\Ye submit that this n1ethod of explaining does not con-
stitute reversible or prejudicial error. We submit that 
the trial court was not in error in following the procedure 
as here outlined, especially in view of the fact that de-
fendant does not contend that any error was committed 
in the statement of law as set forth in the instructions 
other than the very vague insinuation that these rules 
were "loosely" stated. 
Defendant contends that the trial court was not 
fair because all of plaintiff's requested instructions were 
granted and only some of defendant's instructions were 
granted. Perhaps the correctness of the requests pre-
sented had something to do with this. Defendant fails to 
point out how this can be or was either error or preju-
dicial error. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS NOS:. 7 AND 8. 
Defendant complains of Instructions Nos. 7 and 8 
upon two grounds: (1) that they give to the jury a roving 
commission to find the defendant guilty of any and all 
negligence which may occur to them; and (2) that these 
instructions are mere statements of abstract principles 
of law outside of the issues and the evidence. 
Instruction No. 7 was necessary by reason of testi-
mony introduced without objection by plaintiff. The 
witness Barnes testified that there was no one particular 
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method followed in taking loads from the load track and 
spotting them on the bin. He stated that there were two 
ways which were followed. One method was to couple 
the engine to the cars and push them out. The other 
method was to permit the cars to drop along the bin track 
pulled by gravity and to stop them by the use of hand 
brakes at the desired spot (R. 145, 146). These were 
the only two methods about which there was any evi-
dence. As indicated in the brief of appellant, evidence 
was adduced by both parties regarding these respective 
methods. 
As a phase of the negligence in using and adopting 
the method of dropping the cars the plaintiff's conten-
tion developed from the foregoing testimony that the 
defendant had a duty to adopt and prescribe a reason-
ably safe method of performing such work and in view of 
the fact that they have not done so, they were negli-
gent in not prescribing that the cars should be spotted on 
the bin by pushing them to the spot desired by means 
of the engine with its obviously greater control of the 
cars. In view of the evidence introduced the jury cer-
tainly could not be mislead by this instruction in imagin-
ing other and different ways by whch the cars could be 
placed on the bin. Defendant states that the jury was 
not limited to the one particular alleged unsafe method 
prescribed and set forth in the complaint. We are unable 
to imagine any other methods than the two above de-
scribed by which cars could be spotted upon the bin. 
Plaintiff at all times during the trial contended that the 
dropping of the cars and spotting them was an unsafe 
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method and that the pushing of the cars under the con-
trol of the engine to the bin was a safe method of ac-
complishing this work. No other contention could have 
been made under the evidence, under the pleadings, nor 
under the instructions. The jury was of necessity limited 
to a consideration of these two methods. 
"\Ye submit that under the facts and circumstances of 
this case there could be no roving commission given to 
the jury by this instruction to find any other unsafe 
method than the one adopted by Station Agent Brown 
and Conductor Barnes in accomplishing the task at hand. 
This same complaint is made of Instruction No. 8. 
This instruction is one which is given in every case where 
it is sought to establish liability against the master by 
reason of the negligence of his servants or employees. 
By this instruction the jury was instructed that the de-
fendant was responsible for the negligence of its em-
ployees while acting within the course of their employ-
ment. There is no statement in this instruction that if 
the jury find an employee negligent, then plaintiff is 
entitled to recover. 
The cases cited by defendant in its brief are cases 
where the instruction informed the jury that they were 
to find for the plaintiff if an employee of the defendant 
was negligent. We are not here concerned with such an 
instruction. 
For instance, in Herring v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 
299 TIL 214, 132 N. E. 792, the instruction held erroneous 
ends with the words ''then the jury will find the defend-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
ant guilty.'' The questioned instruction contains no 
such words. Instruction No.2 (R. 69) limits recovery to 
the grounds alleged. 
The trial court by said Instruction No. 2 instructed 
the jury that plaintiff could recover only in the event 
that the negligence as set forth in the complaint was 
found to exist by a preponderance of the evidence. Hence, 
the trial court limited the jury to a consideration of the 
issues as presented by the pleadings and the evidence. 
Only in the event that the jury found such negligence 
could a verdict be returned in favor of plaintiff. It, 
therefore, follows that the only negligence of employees 
which could be imputed to the defendant and establish 
liability must have been such negligence as would come 
within the issues defined by the court. 
We submit that neither Instruction No. 7 nor 8 gave 
the jury a roving commission to find for plaintiff on 
any or all grounds of negligence which the jury might 
be able to allege. 
The defendant's second criticism of these instruc-
tions is that they are mere statements of abstract prin-
ciples of law. 
Instruction No.7, as above pointed out, is based upon 
specific evidence introduced at the trial of this case, 
wherein it appeared that the defendant had failed to 
prescribe a safe method to accomplish the task of spot-
ting cars on the coal bin, that is, the defendant had failed 
to require that cars be pushed by the engine to the bin. 
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When considered in the light of this evidence this in-
struction cannot possibly be said to be an abstract state-
ment of the law. This definitely was related to the is-
sue raised by the allegation contained in paragraph 8(a) 
of plaintiff's complaint (R. 4). 
Instruction No. 8 informed the jury of the we'll-
established rule of law that an employer is civilly liable 
for the negligence of his employee performed within the 
scope of his employment and that in the present case 
the negligence of defendant's employees would be im-
putable to the defendant if such negligence was within 
the scope of the employee's employment. This is not 
an abstract principle of law which has no application 
to the issues in the case at bar. This is an instruction to 
which plaintiff was entitled and the jury should have 
been instructed relative to this rule of law. The defend-
ant corporation in this case could not act except through 
employees. It then became necessary to inform the jury 
that the negligence of employees could be imputed -to 
the defendant. Liability could not be predicated upon 
negligence which did not come within Instruction No. 2. 
We submit that both instructions No'S. 7 and 8 were 
statements of principles of law, having direct application 
to the facts of this case and to the eviidence and the is-
sues tried in the trial court. 
POINT VI. 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE ESTAB-
LISHED AS MATTER OF LAW THAT DEFEND-
ANT WAS NEGLIGENT AND THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
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DECEDENT THOMAS WAS NOT GUILTY OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND HENCE ANY ER-
RORS REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS RELATING 
TO LIABILITY DO NOT CONSTITUTE PREJU-
DICIAL OR REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In the first four points in defendant's brief and 
which have heretofore been answered by plaintiff, the 
defendant contends that errors were made on instruc-
tions relating to the question of liability. As held in the 
case of Bruner" v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 P. 2d 
649, where the negligence of the defendant is established 
as a matter of law any errors in the court's instruction 
regarding liability do not constitute reversible or pre-
judicial error_. 
The defendant does not claim in its brief that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the finding of lia-
bility made by the jury. ·This is understandable when one 
considers the conclusive character of the evidence of neg-
ligence on the part of the defendant in having Thomas 
drop and spot cars on the coal bin. While there were gen-
eral statements by the Witness Barnes that this operation 
of dropping and spotting cars was not unusual, it should 
be noted that he stated that he had never seen cars 
dropped and spotted upon the coal bin by any person 
other than a brakeman by the name of Burke (R. 188). 
Burke had been on this job for four or five years (R. 
186, 187). Barnes was not accustomed to doing the work 
in this manner (R. 184). In fact, he had told both 
Thomas and Brakeman Schauster that they would not 
drop any cars to the bin, Barnes knowing that neither 
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Thomas nor Schauster had ever dropped and spotted 
cars on the coal bin. Barnes on each occasion had used 
the engine to spot the cars on the bin (R. 192). It is 
obvious why this method would be used in preference to 
the dropping by gravity and spotting of the cars on the 
bin. In accomplishing the task with the engine it was 
necessary that six or eight cars be used in the opera-
tion. This was required because the engine could not 
go onto the trestle or the bin because of its weight. When 
the operation was performed with the engine all of the 
air brakes ·would be placed in operation under all of the 
six or eight cars used in the movement (R. 247-8-9). By 
this means the operation would be made with the control 
of the engine with its independent brake and with the 
air brakes under the car. This establishes that it would 
be much easier and safer to spot the cars in this manner. 
Barnes, who was in charge of the ground crew (R. 143) 
had determined to spot these two cars upon the bin 
by shoving them out under the control of the engine 
(R. 166). However, in getting these cars into position to 
take them out on the bin track, the engine had been de-
railed (R. 162). The defendant's station agent, Brown, 
when he discovered this situation, talked with Barnes 
and concerning this conversation Barnes stated (R. 165): 
'' Q. Did he give you any directions~ 
* * * 
A. Yes, the first thing he said was that the ovens 
were out of coal, and they were going to have 
to close the ovens down if we didn't get some 
coal onto the bin right away, and he asked 
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me if I would drop two cars onto the bin, 
so they might charge the ovens immedia;tely. '' 
As indicated, Barnes had determined that he would 
shove the cars out with the engine. When asked whether 
he had a reason for having determined to accomplish 
the operation by shoving, he stated (R. 167): 
''A. Yes, there was a reason. I knew these boys 
(Thomas and Schauster) had never taken 
cars to spot out there, without the engine, so 
that was my way of doing it, taking them out 
with the engine." 
Thomas had only been on this job for six days and 
Schauster had been on it ~ve days ·(R. 186). Hence, 
Barnes directed these brakemen, who had never had any 
experience in this operation, to undertake the dropping 
and spotting of the cars on the bin. In this method of 
operation the only control that was had over the cars 
was the hand brake on the lead car. It was necessary 
that the momentum of this car be maintained until it 
was upon the bin. 
We submit that this evidence of the requiring of 
Thomas to drop and spot the cars when he had had 
absolutely no experience and when Barnes had himself, 
because of this inexperience, determined to control the 
spotting of the cars by the engine and the air brakes on 
the cars established negligence as a matter of law. This 
method was chosen as a result of the desire not to per-
mit the coke ovens to cool down. It was based upon a 
desire for haste and was made without .regard to the 
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safety of Thomas and in the very face of the fact that 
Barnes had not wanted to perform the operation in this 
particular manner. 
Concerning the conduct of the deceased there is a 
presumption that he used due care for his own safety. 
16 Am. Jur. 207; 35 Am. Jur. 913; St.ate v. Busby, 102 
Utah 416, 131 P. 2d 510; TeriJYI)OJnt v. Pe~oria & Pekim 
Union R. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed 520•. 
There is in the record absolutely no evidence to over-
come this presumption of due care and hence requires 
a finding as matter of law that the deceased was not 
guilty of contributory negligence. 
Under the authority of the Bruner case, supra, evi-
dence supporting liability as a matter of law eliminates 
any error which may have been committed by the trial 
court on the subject of liability. 
POINT VII. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROPERLY RAISED 
THE OBJECTION IT NOW ASSERTS TO THE 
TRIAL COURT INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS 
MATTER OF LAW ON THE QUESTION OF INTER-
STATE COMMERCE. 
After the defendant entered into the stipulation, 
found at Record 350, it was assumed by all persons con-
nected with the trial of the case that the defendant had 
stipulated the question of Interstate Commerce and had 
agreed that plaintiff's remedy was properly pursued 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. This state-
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. ment is true unless defendant had a secret intent at the 
time, undisclosed to anyone, that it intended to stipu-
late on this matter but to so word the stipulation that it 
would not be effective. We call the Court's attention to 
the carefully worded motion for a directed verdict (R. 
30, 81), in which defendant at no time questioned the 
sufficiency of the evidence on the issue of interstate 
commerce. If they seek to rely upon the insufficiency 
of evidence in any particular, it is well established that 
they should call it to the Court's attention. See Smalley 
v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 34 Utah 423, 98 P. 311; 
Grahi(]Jm v. Ogd·en Union Ry. & DepO't Co., 79 Utah 1, 6 
P. 2d 465. The reason for this is obvious and well stated 
in the foregoing cases. A party should call to the atten-
tion of the trial court and to opposing counsel any de-
ficiencies it claims in the evidence in order that counsel 
for the other side may, if he has other evidence on the 
subject, introduce such evidence at the trial of the case 
and thereby do away with the necessity of an entire re-
trial of the case because of a deficiency in the evidence 
which could have been cured at the first trial. 
It is to be noted that the defendant did not by its 
instructions request that the issue of interstate commerce 
be submitted to the jury and that defendant did not take 
exception to the instruction in which the court stated 
directly that it had determined as matter of law that 
defendant and decedent were mutually engaged in inter-
state commerce, and that any cause of action which 
plaintiff may have to recover damages arises out of and 
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to in the instructions. 
The defendant, in making its exceptions, only ex-
cepted to the second paragraph of Instruction No. 6 ( R. 
359). 
The defendant relies upon an exception taken to 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of Instruction No. 4. Those para-
graphs of Instruction No. 4 merely set forth the statu-
tory provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 
Defendant's contention here seems to be that the ques-
tion of interstate commerce should have been submitted 
to the jury to be determined by them as a question of 
fact. If this had been done it still would have been 
necessary and proper to give paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of 
Instruction No.4 in order that if the jury did find inter-
state commerce they would be properly advised of the 
law as laid down in the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act. There is no statement in the paragraphs indicated 
in Instruction No. 4 which expressly states that the 
court has determined the question of interstate com-
merce as a matter of law. The jury was advised of that 
determination by the first paragraph of Instruction No. 
6 and there is no exception taken to that instruction and 
determination by the court. 
It is submitted that defendant did not at any time 
in the trial court properly call to the attention of the 
trial court or to counsel for the plaintiff that it con-
tended that the issue of interstate commerce should be 
one submitted to the jury for its determination, or that 
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the evidence on that subject was in any way deficient. 
Hence, defendant's present contention comes too late 
and was not properly raised in the trial court. 
POINT VIII. 
DEFENDANT HAS NO RIGHT TO SET OFF 
ANNUITIES PAYABLE UNDER THE RAILROAD 
RETIREMENT ACT. 
Defendant contends that it is entitled to a setoff for 
sums contributed by defendant under the Federal Car-
riers Taxing Act ( 45 U.S.C.A., Sections 261-273 inc.) and 
payable to the widow and children under the provisions 
of the Railroad Retirement Act ( 45 U.S.C.A., Sec. 228e, 
pocket supplement). 
Defendant cites no case to support its contention but 
does cite cases holding that there can be no setoff, which 
cases were cited to the trial court by plaintiff and upon 
which the trial court granted plaintiff's motion to strike 
this setoff. 
Defendant relies upon the wording of Section 55 of 
45 U.S.C.A. That section states that: 
'' * * * such common carrier may set off there-
in any sum it has contributed or paid to any in-
surance, relief benefit or indemnity that may have 
been paid to * * * the person entitled thereto on 
account of the * * * death for which said action 
was brought." 
An examination of defendant's setoff (R. 16, 17) 
shows that it does not come within the literal words of 
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this section, even construed without regard to authority 
or other sections of the Act. 
In the first place, we submit that an annuity paid 
under the Railroad Retirement Act is neither insurance, 
a relief benefit, nor an indemnity. 
Next, the only allowance which can be made is such 
sum or sums as have been paid by the defendant to any 
insurance, etc., "that may have been paid to plaintiff." 
Defendant seeks to set off here not sums which have 
been paid to plaintiff but seeks to recover the present 
value of sums to be paid to the plaintiff in the future. 
The foregoing quoted section of the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act does not contemplate the setoff 
of annuities to be paid in the future. Only such sums 
as have been actually paid to plaintiffs are mentioned. 
Defendant does not in this action seek to recover sums 
\ ' 
which have been paid. It seeks to recover sums which 
are payable in the future. So far as the allegations are 
concerned it states that the widow and children of the 
deceased are receiving or are entitled to receive. There 
is no allegation that these dependants of the deceased 
have received any money as a result of any annuity and 
payments. 
Section 58 of 45 U.S.C.A. provides as follows: 
"Nothing in this chapter shall be held to 
limit the duty or liability of common carriers or 
to impair the rights of their employees under any 
other Act or Acts of Congress.'' 
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As stated in the brief of appellant, at page 64, the 
Hetrick and the Peeler cases state that this is an obstacle 
to a setoff under the provisions of Section 55 of Title 45 
U.S.C.A. It is submitted that this section does prevent 
any such setoff for the practical reason that if a person 
must deduct what they receive under other Acts from 
a judgment for wrongful death or injury, certainly their 
rights under the other Act have been limited or impaired 
because they are not entitled to receive the money under 
the other Acts but such moneys are to be paid by virtue 
of the judgment obtained under the Federal Employers' 
Lia hili ty Act. 
As pointed out in Chicago Great West·ern Ry. Oo. v. 
Beeler, 140 F. 2d 865 (C.C.A. 8), an employercannot set 
up in mitigation of damages in a tort action by an in-· 
jured employee indemnity from a collateral source, such 
as insurance or compensation, or benefits under Work-
men 's Compensation Act, even where the defendant has 
contributed to the fund. 
In the case of Hetrick v. RBading Co., 39 F. Supp. 22, 
25, the Court states : 
''The four corners of the Retirement Act 
and particularly the provisions hereinabove 
quoted disclose that the right to an annuity by 
an em·ployee is preserved intact. Eligibility to the 
annuity based upon disability and service is not 
contingent upon the employee's lack of fault, and 
specifically, the annuity is made impervious to 
the claims of creditors. Furthermore, anticipation 
of the fund is precluded. These provisions indi-
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cate that the fund is the inherent right of the 
employee which becomes crystallized upon the 
occurrence of the designated prerequisites. 
'• The terms of the Employers' Liability Act 
as quoted hereinabove are not inconsistent with 
the inalienableness of an annuity under the Re-
tirement Act. It is expressly provided that noth-
ing in that Act 'shall be. held * * * to impair the 
rights of * * * employees under any other Act or 
Acts of Congress'.'' 
We submit that on both reason and authority the 
defendant is not entitled to a setoff for payments which 
were to be made under the Railroad Retirement Act. 
POINT IX. 
THE VERDICT IS NOT EXCESSIVE AND THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO ORDER A REDUCTION IN THE 
AMOUNT OR A NEW TRIAL. 
Plaintiff was awarded a verdict of $50,000.00 for 
the benefit of the widow and two minor children of the 
deceased. This award was made by a jury of eight in-
dividuals. No exception was taken to the jury or any 
member thereof. No conduct on the part of the jury 
evincing passion or prejudice is called to the attention 
of this court by defendant. A motion for a new trial 
was made and argued. One of the grounds of this motion 
was that the verdict should be cut or a new trial awarded 
because of its excessiveness. The trial court denied this 
motion and thereby placed its stamp of approval upon 
the verdict so rendered. 
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As was stated in Stephens Ramch & Live Stock Co. 
v. Union Pac. R. Co., 48 Utah 528, 161 Pac. 45 at 462: 
'' * * * Necessarily upon such a question ap-
pellate courts must, to a large extent, rely upon 
the judgment and discretion of the trial court. 
That court is in a much better position to observe 
and determine whether a jury was actuated by 
passion or prejudice, or by both, in returning a 
verdict for an amount larger than the evidence 
justifies or whether the jury was merely mis-
taken with regard to the amount that should have 
been allowed. '' 
The most recent discussion of the rules pertaining to 
an exc;essive verdict is contained in the case of P,auly 
v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 436, 184 P. 2d 123. That was 
a personal injury case a!lid the case at bar is a deathl 
case. However, it is submitted that the rules relating to 
excessive verdicts are the same in both types of cases. 
The jury is given a large discretion in fixing the amount 
of damages in death cases. The rule is stated in 25 
C.J.S. 1265, Death, Section 115, as follows: 
''The jury is vested with a large discretion 
in fixing the ·amount of damages, and to justify 
interference by the court it must appear that some 
rule of law has been violated or that the verdict 
was the result of partiality, passion, or preju-
dice. 
''While, as has already been shown, the gen-
eral rule is that the recovery is confined to strict-
ly pecuniary damages, the jury ·are not bound by 
any fixed and precise rules in estimating the 
amount of damages, except in so far as the maxi-
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mum and minimum limits may be fixed by statute, 
but are Yested with a large discretion in fixing 
the amount. There is necessarily difficulty in 
fixing a pecuniary value upon human life; the 
amount of compensation to be recovered must 
depend to quite an extent upon the good judgment 
of the jury under proper instructions from the 
court. Even where the statutes prescribe a maxi-
mum and minimum amount of recovery, the 
amount to be awarded within the prescribed limits 
is within the discretion of the jury. To justify in-
terference by the court with the verdict of the 
jury it must appear that some rule of law has 
been violated, or else that the verdict is so ex-
cessive or grossly inadequate as to indicate parti-
ality, passion, or prejudice in the minds of the 
jury.'' 
In the Pauly case this court stated: 
"Where we can say, as a matter of law, that 
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have 
been given under the influence of passion or pre-
judice, and the trial court abused its discretion or 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a 
motion for new trial, we may order the verdict 
set aside, and a new trial granted. Jensen v. 
D. & R. G. Ry. Co., supra; and other cases cited 
above following that decision. But mere exces-
siveness of a verdict, without more, does not 
necessarily show that the verdict was arrived at 
by passion or prejudice. Stephens Ranch & Live-
stock v. U. P. Ry. Co., supra. It is true that the 
verdict might be so grossly excessive and disap-
proportionate to the injury that we could say from 
that fact alone that as a matter of law the verdict 
must have been arrived at by passion or prejudice. 
But the facts must be such that the excess can be 
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determined as a matter of law, or the verdict 
must be so excessive as to be shocking to one's 
conscience and to clearly indicate passion, pre-
judice, or corruption on the part of the jury. Me-
Afee v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra; 
Ward v. D. & R. G. W. Ry. Co., supra. This is 
not such a case. 
"The verdict here was admittedly liberal. 
But the mere fact that it was more than another 
jury, or more than this court might have given, or 
even more than the evidence justified, does not 
conclusively show that it was the result of pas-
sion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the 
jury.* * *. 
''The jury is allowed great latitude in as-
sessing damages for personal injuries. Miller v. 
So. Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P. 2d 865. The pres-
ent cost of living and the diminished purchasing 
power of the dollar may be taken into considera-
tion when estimating damages. Coke v. Timby, 
57 Utah 53, 192 P. 624; McAfee v. Ogden Union 
Ry. & Depot Co., supra. 
''We can discover nothing in this case, ex-
cept the amount of the verdict, which indicates 
passion or prejudice, and, as we have seen, pas-
sion and prejudice are not necessarily inferred 
from an excessive verdict, without more. No ex-
ception was taken to the jury or any member 
thereof. No conduct on the part of the jury, 
evincing passion and prejudice has been called 
to our attention. The only point of complaint is 
the size of verdict.'' 
We submit that there is nothing about the verdict in 
this case which should cause this court either to reduce 
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000.00 in a case where the person killed was thirty-six 
years of age certainly cannot be said to shock one's con-
science or to indicate passion, prejudice or corruption 
on the part of a jury. The evidence in this case supports 
this v-erdict and we believe would support a verdict in a 
larger amount. 
The trial court instructed the jury in the case at bar 
that plaintiff was entitled to recover compensatory dam-
ages for the p€cuniary loss sustained by the widow and 
two minor children. The jury was instructed that such 
damages consisted of two elements: ( 1) The present 
value of the contributions which the widow and minor 
children could reasonably have expected from the de-
ceased during his lifetime had he lived (R. 84, 86), and 
(2) the pecuniary value of the loss of care, attention, in-
struction, training, advice and guidan0e suffered by the 
minor children of the deceased as a result of his death 
(R. 87). 
The defendant in its brief arrives at the conclusion 
that the widow and children could not expect mor·e than 
$100.00 per month from the deceased. The reasoning 
by which this result is reached cannot be sustained by 
any principle known to the law. 
On her direct examination the widow testified: 
'' Q. About how much do you think was spent on 
an average each month to pay for the house-
hold expenses and to pay the doctor and den-
tist and to pay for the upkeep of the home, 
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and for the food and clothing of yourself and 
children, and all those expenses, about how 
much a month~ 
''A. Oh, $250.00 to $275.00 a month.'' (R. 270). 
Defendant maintains in its brief that this answer was 
forced or pressed out of the witness. The record does 
not support this claim. True it is that she testified that 
deceased made between $250.00 and $275.00 per month, 
but it is apparent 'from reading the record that the wit-
ness misunderstood the question, because, when asked 
if that was what the deceased brought home, she replied: 
''No, he would bring the whole thing home'' and then 
went on to testify his total average earnings while work-
ing for the railroad would amount to from $300.00 to 
$350.00 per month (R. 269). 
Defendant's counsel, on cross examination, asked the 
widow if certain figures he quoted to her were not the 
amount of earnings paid to the deceased by the railroad 
and she testified she imagined these figures were about 
right~ (R. 278, 279). However, it appears without con-
flict that the deceased worked not only for the railroad 
but also worked for contractors on road grading and 
house construction (R. 282). Defendant concludes that 
because the deceased received $51.80 in May from the 
railroad that such sum is a:ll that he earned during that 
month. Such conclusion is not warranted by the ·evidence. 
He could have earned from others and his widow's 
testimony that he earned from $300.00 to $350.00 per 
month will justify the conclusion that he did work for 
others to supplement his railroad income. 
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Defendant also eliminates any income during the 
months of January and February and assumes that de-
ceased worked on his house during these two months. 
This conclusion is not justified by the widow's testi-
mony. She stated that when he was not working for 
anyone for money he was engaged in painting and repair-
ing their home. She testified regarding the time spent do-
ing this work as follows: 
"Oh, all together I expect it would be-in '47, 
let's see, all together I expect it would be two 
months." (R. 283). 
Certainly this work and labor of the deceased con-
stituted a contribution to his family and should not be 
written off and be excluded in arriving at the pecuniary 
loss suffered by his family as a result of his death. 
It is unreasonable to believe that a working man 
would be able to spend two full months in succession 
without any income and still be able to keep his family 
from starving to death. The reasonable inference to he 
drawn from this testimony is that at times during the 
year 1947, totalling about two months, he spent paint-
ing and repairing his home and that such work was done 
when he was not working for either the railroad or for 
contractors. 
At the time of his death deceased was making from 
$18.00 to $20.00 per day (R. 261). 
We submit that the evidence taken as a whole would 
reasonably justify a finding that decedent's earning 
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capacity amounted to $300.00 a month and that a con-
clusion that $200.00 a month could be reasonably ex-
pected as contributions by his family would be well with-
in the evidence introduced in this case. That figure alone 
would justify and support the entire verdict in this case. 
$200.00 per month for the expectancy of deceased, dis-
counted at two and three-fourths percent interest 
amounts to $50,113.19. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit "T"). 
Even if we eliminate the two months of the nine in 
the year 1947 for work on the house, we have an average 
of $233.00 per month. (Seven times $300.00 equals $2,-
100.00 divided by nine equals $233.00). Subtract from 
this the $65.00 a month board and lodging away from 
home and we have $168.00 for contributions to his fami-
ly. Using Plaintiff's Exhibit "T" and a rate of two and 
three-fourths percent discount, we find that the present 
value of such contributions amounts to $39,589.46, leav-
ing a balance of $10,410.54 to be accounted for in the 
loss of care, attention, instruction, training, etc. 
We submit that $10,000.00 to $11,000.00 for loss of 
this latter element of damages does not indicate passion 
or prejudice and is authorized by the evidence in the 
record concerning the disposition of the deceased toward 
his wife and children. (See R. 265, 271, 272). 
This element of damage has been recognized as re-
coverable in cases under the Fedenal EmpZoyers' Liabili-
ty Act; Michiga;n C. R. Co. v. Vree~and, 227 U.S. 59, 
33 S. Ct. 192, 57 L. Ed. 417, Annotated Cases 1914 (c) 
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176; Norfolk & Western Ry. Co'. v. Htolbif10iok, 235 U.S. 
625, 35 S. Ct. 1 ±3, 59 L. Ed. 392. 
We submit that the verdict rendered in this case is 
not one which should be interfered with by this court and 
there is absolutely no showing either by the amount or 
otherwise that the jury was influenced by passion, preju-
dice or corruption. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the defendant in 
this case had a fair and impartial trial by a jury of 
citizens of Salt Lake County, that the verdict both as 
to liability and damages was supported and sustained 
by the evidence adduced by the parties; no pre1judicial 
error resulted from any of the instructions or rulings of 
the trial court and no error was committed in the denial 
of defendant's motion for a new trial. The judgment of 
the trial court should, therefore, be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE & BLACK, 
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS, 
WAYNE L.. BLACK, 
Att~orneys for Respondenft. 
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